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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society-The Private
Attorney General Theory Is No Longer Available to
Shift the Cost of Attorneys' Fees from the Victorious
Litigant to the Losing Party.
INTRODUCTION
The American rule of litigation requires that each party be re-
sponsible for the fees of his attorney, win or lose. However, both the
legislature and the judiciary have recognized exceptions to the rule,
to allow parties to recover their attorneys' fees from their opponent.
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,' the Su-
preme Court ruled that the "private attorney general" theory, a
recent judicially created exception to the American rule, was no
longer a viable theory upon which to base an award of attorneys'
fees.
BACKGROUND OF THE DECISION
On March 26, 1970, respondents,2 three non-profit environmental
organizations, filed a complaint against the Secretary of the Interior
and a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the issuance
of certain permits required for the construction of the trans-Alaska
pipeline.3 The district court granted the injunction.' The court
based its decision on two grounds: the application of Alyeska5 ex-
ceeded the limitations that Congress had established in section 28
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 on the amount of public lands
that could be diverted to pipeline use and that the environmental
and other safeguards set forth in the National Environmental Policy
Act of 19691 (NEPA), had not been applied to the project.
1. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
2. Viz. the Wilderness Society, the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and the Friends
of the Earth.
3. For a further discussion of events surrounding this litigation, see Dominick and Brody,
The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-
tion Act, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 337 (1973).
4. Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
5. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company was owned by a consortium consisting of Exxon
Pipeline Company, Mobil Pipeline Company, ARCO Pipeline Company, Phillips Petroleum
Company, Union Oil Company of California, Sohio Pipeline Company, and Amerada-Hess
Corporation. This entity submitted the application for the permits.
6. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
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In September of 1971, the State of Alaska and petitioner Alyeska
were allowed to intervene. On March 20, 1972, the Interior Depart-
ment released to the public a six-volume Environmental Impact
Statement and a three-volume Economic and Security Analysis.
After the period of time set aside for public comment, the Secretary
announced that Alyeska would be granted the permits it requested
for the trans-Alaska pipeline.
Proceedings in the district court were then reinstated. Both the
Mineral Leasing Act and NEPA issues were briefed and argued. The
district court vacated the preliminary injunction, ruled in favor of
defendants on all issues, and dismissed the complaint.'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, relying solely on the Mineral Leasing Act. 0 The
court declined to decide the merits of respondents' NEPA conten-
tions because those issues would involve unnecessary delay to the
decision." The Supreme Court denied certiorari." But, shortly
thereafter, Congress amended the Mineral Leasing Act"3 to allow the
Secretary to grant permits to Alyeska and also amended NEPA, 4
making further action by Alyeska unnecessary.
Before these amendments were passed, respondents filed a bill of
costs with the court of appeals. The petition prayed for an award of
expenses and compensation for 4,455 hours of attorney time involv-
ing both the court proceedings and the submission of comments
regarding the impact statement to the Department of Interior." The
District of Columbia Circuit granted the petition for an award of
attorneys' fees, holding that plaintiffs qualified under the private
attorney general exception." In a five-to-two decision, the Supreme
8. Alyeska had argued that their interests could not be represented adequately by existing
parties. The responsibilities and duties of the Secretary of the Interior, it was noted by
Alyeska, did not include or concern the proprietary and financial interests of Alyeska or its
subcontractors or agents. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
9. The decision is not reported. See Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 851 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
13. 30 U.S.C.A. § 185 (Supp. 1975) amending, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
14. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1651 et seq. (Supp. 1975) amending, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
15. Brief for Respondent at 6, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society,
421 U.S. 240 (1975)'.
16. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court stated:
Acting as private attorneys general, not only have they ensured the proper function-
ing of our system of government, but they have advanced and protected in a very
concrete manner substantial public interests. An award of fees would not have
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Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court rejected the private
attorney general theory as an unwarranted judicial incursion on the
American rule, which forbids the award of attorneys fees to the
prevailing party.
In referring to the nonaward rule, the Court stated:
[T]he rule followed in our courts with respect to attorneys' fees
has survived. It is deeply rooted in our history and in congressional
policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature's province by
redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested by respon-
dents and followed by the Courts of Appeals."
THE AMERICAN RULE AND rrs EXCEPrIONS
Unlike the practice of most other nations, 8 American litigation
requires that each party be responsible for the fees of his own attor-
ney, win or lose. It is not altogether clear how or why the American
rule was adopted. Early courts in the colonial United States rou-
tinely awarded all costs, including attorneys' fees, to the successful
litigant. 9 American courts subsequently abandoned this practice of
including attorneys' fees as costs. One explanation given is that
during colonial times lawyers were considered unnecessary and gen-
erally held in suspicion. Thus, the courts did not wish to encourage
their use by awarding them costs.29 The adoption of the American
rule has also been attributed to the individualism of the colonials
who believed that each person should bear whatever financial
burdens were involved in the litigation.2'
Regardless of the original rationale underlying the American rule,
early courts recognized and consistently upheld the rule.Y For ex-
unjustly discouraged appellee Alyeska from defending its case in court. And deny-
ing fees might well have deterred appellants from undertaking the heavy burden
of this litigation.
Id. at 1036.
17. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975).
18. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L.
REv. 792 (1966).
19. Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 636 (1974).
20. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 873 (1929) citing C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN BAR (1913).
21. See R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 112-38 (1921); Note, Attorney's Fees:
Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216, 1220-21 (1967).
22. The District of Columbia Circuit noted:
The chief rationale behind the American rule is the notion that parties might be
unjustly discouraged from instituting or defending actions to vindicate their rights
if the penalty for losing in court included the fees of their opponent's counsel.
Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" . . . the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what
19761
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ample, in Oelrichs v. Spain,23 the Court held that the lack of a
measurable attorneys' fees standard justified the rule. 24 In Stewart
v. Sonneborn,2 the Court ruled that attorneys' fees were not re-
coverable because they were not proximately caused by the actions
of the defendant; also, it was not foreseeable that a party would
employ a lawyer when he was criminally prosecuted. The Supreme
Court has continued to follow the traditional rule that attorneys'
fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or
enforceable contract providing therefore.28
Despite the acceptance of the nonaward rule in the United States,
there are instances in litigation where the prevailing party can re-
cover attorneys' fees from his opponent. Congress has made statu-
tory allowances for the recovery of attorneys' fees in a variety of
circumstances. Under some statutes, the award is mandatory,2 7
while others confer discretionary power upon the courts to shift fees
to the successful plaintiff.28 Besides statutory exceptions, federal
courts, exercising their inherent equitable power, have fashioned
certain exceptions to the nonaward rule. Courts have held that the
interests of justice at times require an award of attorneys' fees to
certain litigants.2 Consequently, three exceptions to the American
rule developed.
A finding of bad faith or oppressive tactics by one party is suffi-
cient to prompt a court to award fees to his opponent." This "obdur-
constitutes reasonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial administra-
tion." Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). See also
6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.70 (2), at 54-1304 (2d ed. 1974).
23. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872).
24. Id. The Court noted:
Some counsel demand much more than others. Some clients are willing to pay
more than others. More counsel may be employed than are necessary. When both
client and counsel know that the fees are to be paid by the other party there is
danger of abuse. A reference to a master, or an issue to a jury, might be necessary
to ascertain the proper amount, and the grafted litigation might possibly be more
animated and protracted than that in the original cause. It would be an office of
some delicacy on the part of the court to scale down the charges, as might some-
times be necessary.
Id. at 231.
25. 98 U.S. 187 (1878)
26. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
27. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) (Truth-in-Lending Act); 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970)
(Railway Labor Act of 1926); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) (Fair Labor Standards Act).
28. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) (patent infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) (Securi-
ties Act of 1933); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) (Fair Housing Act of 1933).
29. See Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). See also Universal Oil
Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946).
30. Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
[Vol. 7
Attorney's Fees
ate behavior" exception3' has been utilized to punish the party who
has engaged in groundless, oppressive, or vexatious conduct and to
reimburse his opponent for unnecessary litigation expenses. Re-
cently, the bad faith exception has been expanded in school desegre-
gation cases, where defendant school districts were found to have
precipitated unnecessary litigation .32
A second exception to the American rule is the "common benefit"
doctrine. Initially, the exception was applicable where, as a result
of litigation, a party created a fund or protected an identifiable
number of beneficiaries. 33 When a party created or protected a fund
in which others had a beneficial interest, equity required that such
a person should be reimbursed for his reasonable expenses, includ-
ing attorneys' fees, from the fund itself or by some other equitable
arrangement.3 4 In terms of policy, this exception to the American
rule essentially encompasses notions of restitution for the plaintiff
and the avoidance of unjust enrichment for the class members.
From a narrow group of cases in which a common fund was pro-
tected or created for the benefit of an identifiable group, the "com-
mon fund" principle was expanded and applied to cases where liti-
gation did not actually result in or protect a fund, but produced a
comparable effect by establishing a precedent for others.35 Recently,
the Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.31 held that
attorneys' fees can be awarded if plaintiff confers a "substantial
benefit," which need not be of a pecuniary nature, to members of
an identifiable class.
The fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never pro-
duce, a monetary recovery from which the fees could be paid does
not preclude an award based on this rationale. Although the earli-
est cases recognizing a right to reimbursement involved litigation
that had produced or preserved a "common fund" for the benefit
of a group, nothing in these cases indicates that the suit must
actually bring money into the court as a prerequisite to the court's
power to order reimbursement of expenses.37
The substantial benefit or common benefit approach of Mills was
31. See Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 589 (1946).
32. Bell v. School Board, 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Clark v. Board of Education, 369
F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966).
33. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
34. 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77(2), at 54-1705 (2d ed. 1974).
35. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
36. 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (a shareholder derivative action to set aside a merger).
37. Id. at 392.
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reaffirmed in Hall v. Cole."8 In that case, a union member sued to
regain membership under section 102 of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act." He was expelled from the union for
deliberate and malicious vilification of union management. The
Court reasoned:
When a union member is disciplined for the exercise of any of the
rights protected by Title I, the rights of all the members of the
union are threatened. And, by vindicating his own right, the suc-
cessful litigant dispels the "chill" cast upon the rights of others."
The Court rejected the argument that the absence of a specific
fee-shifting provision in section 102 indicated congressional intent
to prevent fee-shifting. This determination was made despite the
fact that other sections of the Act, sections 201 (c) and 501 (b) had
authorized the recovery of counsel fees." However, notwithstanding
its recent expansion, this theory is still limited by requirements of:
(1) conferring a benefit upon the members of an ascertainable class;
and (2) being a case in which an award of fees will serve to spread
the costs of litigation among its beneficiaries.42 Therefore, in the
A lyeska context, the imposition of attorneys' fees upon corporations
like petitioner's would not serve to further the strict designs of the
doctrine.
PRIVATE ArORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION
Prior to Alyeska, federal courts applied another significant excep-
tion to the American rule-the private attorney general exception.
Basically, this recent exception provides for allowance of attorneys'
fees to a private litigant who ensures the effectuation of a strong
congressional policy. The development of the private attorney gen-
eral theory has been traced to four factors:4 3 (1) that fee shifting
under federal regulatory statutes provided a successful example of
the use of congressionally authorized awards as an incentive for
private enforcement of public policy;44 (2) that the central role of
litigation in the civil rights movement led to congressional enact-
38. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
40. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).
41. For further discussion, see text accompanying note 39 supra.
42. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). See also Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HAv. L. REV. 849, 897 (1975). It should
be noted that the term "class" as used in this context is not synonomous with "class action."
43. Comment, Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 636, 658-59 (1974).
44. See notes 27 and 28 supra.
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ment of attorney fee provisions in the various civil rights acts of the
1960's;'5 (3) the liberalization and expansion of standing;" (4) the
liberalization of rules governing class actions.' Thus, where the bad
faith and common benefit exceptions were inapplicable, federal
courts considered the private attorney general exception.
The need for private enforcement of federal laws designed to pro-
tect broad public interests is an essential precept of the private
attorney general theory. It has been argued that restricted funding,
heavily centralized bureaucratic organization, and direct conflicts
of interest within the various administrative agencies and the
United States Attorney General's office have left a void in law en-
forcement that requires filling by private litigants." However, few
private attorneys can afford to take on an important public issue if
there is no possibility of recompense. First, public interest litigation
lawsuits generally involve complex and often novel issues of fact and
law which require substantial preparation and expense." Secondly,
the suits frequently seek injunctive rather than monetary relief and
are brought on behalf of clients who lack financial resources.50 In
short, the protection of important federal rights depends on the
efforts of skilled attorneys who need encouragement to undertake
such difficult and time-consuming litigation.5'
An essential element in the award of fees based on the private
attorney general exception is the strength of the congressional pol-
icy being enforced by the successful plaintiff. Though courts have
regularly determined the motives of Congress, there are difficulties
involved when a court attempts to justify fee-shifting upon the
relative strength of a public policy. Determinations of a congres-
sional policy's strength or weakness are arguably not issues ideally
suited for the courts. No reasonably objective standards can be
45. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c).
46. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). But see
Sierra Club v. Morton, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Warth v. Seldin, 95
S.Ct. 2197 (1975).
47. See FED. R. Cv. P. 23. But see Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
48. See Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial
Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973).
49. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301, 305-
06 (1973).
50. Id.
51. See Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (lst Cir. 1974); accord, Souza v. Travisano, 512 F.2d
1137 (lst Cir. 1975).
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formulated to differentiate statutes on the basis of the relative
strengths of their respective policy goals.2
Additional problems arise when courts attempt to weigh the need
for private enforcement of a statute. Judgments would have to be
made concerning the effectiveness of the various agencies entrusted
with the enforcement of the statute. However, these decisions would
often be based upon factors existing outside the scope of the case.
Also, if public enforcement is adequate, a losing defendant should
not be taxed exclusively."3
The private attorney general exception to the American rule
gained considerable momentum in the lower federal courts after the
Supreme Court decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.54 In
Newman, the petitioners, in a class action, enjoined racial discrimi-
nation at respondents' South Carolina restaurants. The Court
granted attorneys' fees under the discretionary fees section of Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 204(a). 5  It reversed the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' instruction to the district court
to award counsel fees only if the trial court found bad faith. The
Supreme Court explained the reasoning involved:
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own at-
torneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to ad-
vance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the
federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel
fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance
arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to en-
courage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judi-
cial relief under Title IH."
Newman was viewed as important by those who favored liberali-
zation of the nonaward rule 7 for two reasons. First, it indicated a
turnabout from the Court's approach a year earlier in Fleischmann
52. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 636, 671 (1974). However, it can be argued that since courts frequently decide
cases based upon their interpretation of legislative intent, the relative strength or weakness
of a congressional policy is measurable by merely carrying the legislative intent analysis one
step further, i.e., weighing the strength of the congressional intent.
53. Id. In other words, if the agency entrusted with enforcement of the statute is lax in
enforcing it, a defendant who would not have had to pay the government's attorneys' fees
should not be burdened with the successful private plaintiff's fee award.
54. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
56. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968).
57. See generally, McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorneys' Fees: A New Method of Fi-
nancing Legal Service, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in
Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement
of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's
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Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Corp.'s In Fleischmann, plaintiff's
action for trademark infringement under section 35 of the Lanham
Act59 was held insufficient to justify fee-shifting.
The recognized exceptions to the general rule were not, however,
developed in the context of statutory causes of action for which the
legislature had prescribed intricate remedies. Trademark actions
under the Lanham Act do occur in such a setting. 0
Secondly, the language employed by the Court in Newman seemed
to evidence a more liberal stance toward fee-shifting. The Court
interpreted a discretionary provision for attorneys' fees as a "virtual
command always to award fees to a successful plaintiff."'" The atti-
tude of the Court toward the judiciary's power to award attorneys'
fees shifted. Instead of considering the award simply as a way to
punish the losing party for misconduct, fee-shifting was seen as
"an effective way of encouraging 'private attorneys general' to bring
lawsuits that advance the public interest."6
This novel approach to the award of attorneys' fees was also re-
flected in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 3 Although Mills involved
the application of the common benefit theory rather than the pri-
vate attorney general exception as in Newman, both decisions em-
phasized the need to provide the individual with private law en-
forcement power. Markedly absent from both decisions were any
implications that judicially-created exceptions were out of place in
a statutory cause of action.6 Also missing was the broad language
that these exceptions to the fee rule were to be narrowly construed. 5
It should be noted, however, that both Newman and Mills in-
volved rather limited fact situations. Mills was a shareholder suit
brought under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.6 The
Court in Mills did not specifically overrule Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Corp.," but distinguished it on the parti-
Fees: Why not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees
and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1931).
58. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970).
60. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Corp., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967).
61. See Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301,
319 (1973).
62. Id. at 320.
63. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
64. See Note, The Allocation of Attorneys' Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38
U. Cm. L. REV. 316 (1971).
65. Id.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
67. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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cular statute involved in Fleischmann. The Lanham Act 65 provides
all the remedies available to a plaintiff who proves his valid trade-
mark has been infringed. Similarly, Newman spoke only to the spe-
cific fee granting discretion provided by Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act."
APPLICATION OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION
As previously discussed,70 the Newman and Mills decisions
prompted the lower federal courts to utilize the private attorney
general concept to award fees to a successful plaintiff in a number
of cases. Although the techniques and the exact rationales employed
in the application of the private attorney general exception differed
in the federal courts, the fact remains that the courts considered the
exception viable and particularly useful.
In Lee v. Southern Home Cites Corp. ," an action brought under
42 U.S.C. § 198272 alleging racial discrimination in selling lots, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that awarding attorneys' fees was an appro-
priate means for the federal courts to employ in effectuating the
congressional policy of the Civil Rights Acts. The court relied on
Mills, Newman, and certain federal statutes which allowed the
award of fees and embodied legislative policies closely analagous to
those supporting section 1982, which had no comparable provision
for attorneys' fees. Private suits were viewed as a valid and neces-
sary means of enforcing certain congressional policies and the award
of fees was therefore justified as a means of encouraging such en-
forcement.
The Fifth Circuit extended the principle of Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp.73 in Cooper v. Allen 7 to allow fee-shifting in a 42
U.S.C. § 198115 suit. The court explained:
Admittedly, Newman involved a suit brought under a civil rights
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). Moreover, the Court has always been extremely sensi-
tive to the policies underlying civil rights legislation.
70. See text accompanying notes 63 through 65 supra.
71. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.
73. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
74. 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
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statute which makes specific allowance for attorneys' fees. But in
Lee v. Southern Home Cites Corp., this Court extended the
Newman doctrine to section 1982 suits. There is no relevant dis-
tinction between a section 1982 suit and a section 1981 suit such
as this one.7"
Brandenburger v. Thompson,17 an action brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,7 successfully challenged Hawaii's one-year durational resi-
dency requirement for welfare benefits. Plaintiffs were awarded at-
torneys' fees because the court decided they had satisfied the re-
quirements of the private attorney general theory. As defined by the
court, an award should be made to a litigant who furthers the inter-
ests of a significant class of persons by effectuating a strong congres-
sional policy. 7" In this case, plaintiffs benefited two significant
classes, potential welfare recipients and interstate travelers, by
vindicating the federally protected right of travel free from the for-
feiture of welfare benefits. Since section 1983 expresses a strong
policy of vindicating federal constitutional rights against infringe-
ment by state officials, the plaintiffs furthered congressional policy
by challenging the Hawaii statute.
In another civil rights case, Fowler v. Schwarzwalder,0 the Eighth
Circuit instructed the district court on remand:
[I]n fashioning an effective remedy for the rights declared by
Congress one hundred years ago, courts should look not only to
policy of the enacting Congress, but also to the policy embodied
in closely related legislation.'
Consequently, the district court, in considering the violation of sec-
tion 1981, was instructed to give weight to the teachings in Mills and
Newman and the actions of Congress in enacting those sections of
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, paint, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every other
kind, and to no other.
76. Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972).
77. 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
79. Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974).
80. 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974).
81. Id. at 145.
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the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts aimed at similarly defined social
problems.
Prison inmates were awarded attorneys' fees under the private
attorney general rationale in Souza v. Travisano.s2 In that case,
inmates successfully challenged, under section 1983, a prison regu-
lation limiting their access to attorneys and law students. The First
Circuit grounded its ruling upon an earlier decision, Hoitt v. Vitek,
8 3
involving a similar section 1983 action by prisoners. There the court
stated:
[Tihe Public, as well as all present and future prisoners, benefits
when the constitutionality of the treatment of prisoners is assured
• ..the bar ought to be encouraged to give them legal aid and
advice in order to secure their rights."4
In La Raza Unida v. Volpe,5 the court noted:" . . . the average
attorney or litigant must hesitate, if not shudder, at the thought of
'taking on' an entity such as the California Department of High-
ways, with no prospect of financial compensation for the efforts and
expenses rendered." ' The court allowed attorneys' fees, basing the
award upon the strength of the congressional policy, the number of
people benefited by the litigants' efforts, and the necessity and fin-
ancial burden of private enforcement.
In addition to a strict private attorney general approach, federal
courts have authorized fee awards based upon a combination of the
main exceptions.8 7 Courts have also granted the award using these
judicial exceptions in the alternative. In Cornist v. Richland Parish
School Board," a section 1983 civil rights action by black teachers,
the court employed both the bad faith and the private attorney
general exceptions in allowing fee-shifting. Likewise, in Fairley v.
Patterson,"' a reapportionment case, the obdurate behavior and the
private attorney general theories supported an award to the private
plaintiffs.
The Mills common benefit approach was merged with the
Newman private attorney general exception to form the rationale for
82. 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975).
83. 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 220.
85. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (an environmental protection and housing assistance
case).
86. Id. at 101.
87. I.e., the bad faith, common benefit, and private attorney general exceptions.
88. 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974).
89. 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974).
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fee shifting in Sims v. Amos" and NAACP v. Allen." In Sims, where
plaintiffs sued to secure reapportionment of the state legislature,
the district court held that plaintiffs were entitled to a fee award
since they had benefited their class and effectuated a strong con-
gressional policy. That court applied identical reasoning in NAACP
v. Allen, a section 1983 civil rights case involving state employment
discrimination. This particular line of reasoning has been criticized
because dual concepts of statutory vindication and class-wide bene-
fit appear to be redundant, since in most cases the act of vindicating
congressional policy will ipso facto confer a benefit upon plaintiff's
class. 2
In several cases, the trial court has failed to specify which excep-
tion to the nonaward rule was employed. In Taylor v. Perini,93 a
section 1983 prisoners' rights case, the Sixth Circuit was uncertain
about which theory the district court had based its award upon.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals, recognizing the private attorney
general theory, decided that fee-shifting was proper because there
existed no particular substantial award of damages and the award
served to prevent the unjust discouragement of parties in bringing
suit to vindicate important rights. 4
The district court in Donahue v. Staunton,95 a section 1983 free
speech case, failed to specify the grounds upon which it allowed
fee-shifting to plaintiffs. However, the Seventh Circuit held that the
rationale for the award appeared on the face of the record.
The benefit to the general public, i.e., of encouraging free and
robust public discussion, is substantial in this case and should not
depend for its protection upon the financial status of the individual
who is deprived of his constitutional rights. 6
In sum, the federal courts,97 drawing from the strong language of
the Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises and Mills
90. 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
91. 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
92. See Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial
Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973). This
criticism would also apply to the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Brandenburger v. Thompson,
494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 79 supra.
93. 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court for a
finding of its reason for granting attorneys' fees.
94. Id. at 905.
95. 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973).
96. Id. at 483.
97. See Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.
1973); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Harper v. Mayor and City Council,
359 F.Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F.Supp.
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v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., have not been hesitant in utilizing the
private attorney general exception. In cases where the traditional
and relatively limited exceptions to the American rule were inappl-
icable, federal courts, pursuant to their equitable jurisdiction, have
awarded attorneys' fees under the broader rationale of the private
attorney general exception.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In Alyeska,5 the Supreme Court strongly emphasizes the con-
straints of section 192311 upon the concept of fee-shifting. Section
1923 of 28 U.S.C.100 is the present version of the fee bill of 1853.01
The Court viewed the fee bill as a barrier to further encroachment
upon the American rule of litigation:
Since the approach taken by Congress to this issue has been to
carve out specific exceptions to a general rule that federal courts
cannot award attorneys' fees beyond the limits of 28 U.S.C. 1923,
those courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect
to the allowance of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in federal
1219 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F.Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Ross. v. Goshi, 351 F.Supp. 949 (D. Haw. 1972);
Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F.Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971). But see Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43
(5th Cir. 1974); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commis-
sion, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1974); Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.
1972) rev'd. on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Gray v. Creamer, 376 F.Supp. 675 (W.D.
Pa. 1974).
98. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970) provides:
(a) Attorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United States may be
taxed as costs as follows:
$20 on trial or -final hearing (including a default judgment whether entered
by the court or by the clerk) in civil, criminal, or admiralty cases, except that
in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the libellant recovers
less than $50 the proctor's docket fee shall be $10;
$20 in admiralty appeals involving not over $1,000;
$50 in admiralty appeals involving not over $5,000;
$100 in admiralty appeals involving more than $5,000;
$5 on discontinuance of a civil action;
$5 on motion for judgment and other proceedings on recognizances;
$2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence.
(b) The docket fees of United States attorneys shall be paid to the clerk of the
court and by him paid into the Treasury.
(c) In admiralty appeals the court may allow as costs for printing the briefs of the
successful party not more than:
$25 where the amount involved is not over $1,000;
$50 where the amount involved is not over $5,000;
$75 where the amount involved is over $5,000.
100. It should be noted that Petitioner failed to argue 28 U.S.C. § 1923 in its brief.
101. 10 Stat. 161 (1853).
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litigation or to pick and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes
under which they sue and to award fees in some cases but not in
others, depending upon the court's assessment of the importance
of the public policies involved in particular cases. Nor should the
federal courts purport to adopt on their own initiative a rule
awarding attorneys' fees based on the private attorney general
approach when such judicial rule will operate only against private
parties and not against the Government.102
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court, conceded that Con-
gress has chosen to rely upon private enforcement of certain statutes
to implement public policy. Thus, courts have allowed counsel fees
so as to encourage this type of litigation. However, he cautioned:
[Clongressional utilization of the private attorney general con-
cept can in no sense be construed as a grant of authority to the
Judiciary to jettison the traditional rule against nonstatutory al-
lowances to the prevailing party and to award attorneys' fees wher-
ever the courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular
statute important enough to warrant the award.1 3
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the docket fees statute as
a barrier to judicially created exceptions appears to be inconsistent
with the federal courts' traditional equitable powers of control over
the costs of litigation. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Sprague
v. Ticonic National Bank, °'0 in considering the power of the federal
courts to award fees:
Allowance of such costs in appropriate situations is part of the
historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts.
... . Plainly the foundation for the historic practice of granting
reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than the conven-
tional [statutory] taxable costs is part of the original authority of
the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation.0 5
In bad faith and common fund exception cases, federal courts
have always acknowledged the viability of the American rule, but
have also stressed their own inherent equitable powers to award
attorneys' fees when the interests of justice so require. A broad
reading of Alyeska could lead federal courts to conclude that they
should restrict the exercise of their equitable powers to award attor-
neys' fees, and should strictly adhere to the American rule and the
102. Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975).
103. Id. at 263.
104. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
105. Id. at 164-66.
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traditional exceptions thereto, unless the legislature otherwise di-
rects.
Mr. Justice White urged that courts are inherently incapable of
determining when public policy should require an award of attor-
neys' fees for private enforcement of a statute. In addition to the
foregoing, the Court noted that the government's immunity against
a fee award could work an injustice against private litigants.,"
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall strongly criticized the
majority approach interpreting the docket fee statute as an impedi-
ment to the federal courts' historic equity powers. He argued,
through an analysis of recent fee-shifting cases, that the courts as
well as the legislature may create and in fact have created excep-
tions to the general rule.
In sum, the Court's primary contention-that Congress enjoys he-
gemony over fee-shifting because of the docketing fee statute and
the occasional express provisions for attorneys' fees-will not with-
stand even the most casual reading of the precedents. The Court's
recognition of the several judge-made exceptions to the American
rule demonstrates the inadequacy of its analysis. Whatever the
Court's view of the wisdom of fee-shifting in "public benefit" cases
in general, I think that it is a serious misstep for it to abdicate
equitable authority in this area in the name of statutory construc-
tion.1,7
Mr. Justice Marshall also noted that there is no basis in precedent
or policy for a restriction of the courts' equitable powers when the
court finds that a fee award is necessary. He stressed that the major-
ity's conceptual difficulties with the private attorney general excep-
tion were somewhat exaggerated:
The Court's concern with the difficulty of applying meaningful
standards in awarding attorneys' fees to successful "public bene-
fit" litigants is a legitimate one, but in my view it overstates the
novelty of the "private attorney general" theory. The guidelines
developed in closely analogous statutory and nonstatutory attor-
neys' fee cases could readily be applied in cases such as the one at
bar. 10
106. Mr. Justice Marshall argued that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 may not preclude a fee award
against the United States in all cases. He stated:
Section 2412 states that the ordinary recoverable costs shall not include attorneys'
fees; it may be read not to bar fee awards, over and above ordinary taxable costs,
when equity demands. In any event, there are plainly circumstances under which
§ 2412 would not bar attorney fee awards against the United States.
421 U.S. 240 at 287 n.9.
107. 421 U.S. 240 at 282 (1975).
108. Id. at 273-74.
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Why did the Alyeska Court so thoroughly reject the private attor-
ney general rationale for fee-shifting? The Court could have ruled
that this case was not proper for the application of the exception
because the statute involved, the Mineral Leasing Act, did not ar-
ticulate a strong congressional policy.'0 9
The Court's decision reflects a negative reaction to lower federal
court application of the private attorney general exception in sec-
tion 1983 actions."'0 Since section 1983 is not merely limited to in-
junctive relief or declaratory judgments for remedies, there is argua-
bly less necessity for recompense of a successful plaintiff's attorneys'
fees. Moreover, section 1983 actions are not confined to a specific
congressional statutory scheme, but encompass a broad spectrum of
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court suggested that a contin-
uation of fee-shifting in section 1983 'actions may well result in an
unwarranted abrogation of the American rule of litigation:
...it would appear that a wide-range of statutes would arguably
satisfy the criterion of public importance and justify an award of
attorneys' fees to the private litigant. And, if any statutory policy
is deemed so important that its enforcement must be encouraged
by awards of attorneys' fees, how could a court deny attorneys' fees
to private litigants in § 1983 actions seeking to vindicate
constitutional rights?"'
CONCLUSION
Alyeska could substantially limit the accessibility of the courts to
private individual plaintiffs and private groups formed to protect a
particular public interest. Conservation, environmental, consumer,
civil liberties and civil rights organizations may have to seek means
other than fee-shifting to help finance their litigation."' Also, it is
argued that certain non-profit public interest organizations possess
sufficient resources to enable them to finance litigation of their
public issue or issues."' Nevertheless, there is bound to be a certain
limiting effect upon an organization's future litigation plans be-
cause of the demise of the private attorney general exception. Much
of the litigation brought by public interest groups is lengthy and
109. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421
U.S. 240 (1975).
110. For complete text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 see note 78 supra.
111. 421 U.S. 240 at 264.
112. Of course, public interest litigants cannot assume that they will always be successful,
let alone, receive an award of attorneys' fees.
113. Brief for Petitioner at 43-45. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421
U.S. 240 (1975).
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complex. Moreover, injunctive relief rather than monetary damages
is generally sought against corporations or governmental units.
Therefore, any decision curtailing the court's power to award attor-
neys' fees will certainly have an adverse affect on these organiza-
tions.
Public interest plaintiffs may attempt to expand the common
benefit exception to compensate for the loss of the private attorney
general exception. However, this approach is limited."4
In actions similar to Alyeska, the restitution-based rationale of
the common benefit exception would preclude a fee award. The
court must have jurisdiction over some source which allows it to
assess the ultimate beneficiaries for plaintiff's costs. But so long as
the court has within its jurisdiction the means of distributing the
costs of litigation, the common benefit theory is adequate. The pri-
vate attorney general theory becomes necessary only when the court
cannot match the costs with the benefits which are created or pro-
tected by judicial action.
Absent a shift in the Court's thinking public interest groups may
be forced to shift their emphasis to the legislature. Consequently,
congressional amendments providing a mandatory award of attor-
neys' fees for particular statutes, or a general fee-shifting provision,
appears to be the most appropriate solution. If there is any message
by the Court to these public interest organizations, it is that they
should seek from Congress, and not the courts, the power to act as
private attorneys general.
LEE G. WERNER
114. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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